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This paper examines the role
International Intergovernmental
Organization (IGO) memberships
have on defense expenditures,
arguing that state leaders substitute
high military spending rates for
IGO membership as the information
transmission mechanisms of IGOs
offer more accurate information
about the security environment that
diminishes the need for military
spending. States do not become
pacifists as they are integrated into
the international network of IGOs;
rather, they find a reduced usefulness
in and need for a robust military.
This project empirically tests this
relationship, and findings indicate
a small but significant relationship
between military spending and IGO
membership. The most integrated
states experience a 1 percent
reduction in their overall military
spending rates. However, this
only applies to non-security IGOs.
Contrary to previous findings,
security IGOs have no consistent
influence on military spending.

INTRODUCTION
Military spending remains a major
spending priority for most states. As
Bohmelt and Bove (2014) articulate,
using Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) data, the
world allocated $1.753 trillion (US
Dollars) in 2 0 12 for military expen ditures. The question of why states
spend money on the military has been
widely addressed by a large literature
within politic al science .1 In general,
this literature has concluded that states
respond to the international security
environment and create budgets that
are the product of domestic political
processes which often include numerous actors with varying interests and
levels of influence. States, who live in
a chaotic and often anarchical world,
pursue multiple security solutions
simultaneously, including establishing
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military competency and strength, defence alliances, forging economic
ties, and utilizing the tools of diplomacy. States can substitute one policy
option for another in their pursuit of security, leading security policy and
defense spending to be influenced by a range of factors. 2 Recent modeling
of military spending has confirmed and determined that the major factors
in determining military spending are regime type, militarized conflict, the
military budgets of allies and enemies and their geographic proximity, economic capacity, and the previous year's budget. 3 These variables contribute
to a nearly complete assessment of military spending decisions. However,
the current analysis leaves out small but important contributing factors to
military spending decisions.
One such small contributing factor
that
the literature has not examined is
States, who live in
the role International Intergovernmental
a chaotic and often
Organizations (IGOs) play in shaping
anarchical world,
military spending decisions. The literapursue multiple security
ture examining the role ofIGOs on state
solutions simultaneously,
behavior has primarily focused on the
including establishing
role of overlapping memberships and
military competency
militarized conflict,4 has examined IGO
and strength, defense
influence mainly in a dyadic context, and
alliances, forging
has demonstrated that IGO membership
economic ties, and
can reduce the propensity of states to
utilizing the tools of
engage in militarized disputes, assist in
the resolution and management ofterdiplomacy.
ritorial disputes, reduce the duration of
5
disputes, and facilitate trade. This literature has found that IGOs are formed
to coordinate security needs, a primary concern of states, by establishing
credible commitments and opportunities for cooperation. 6
This paper argues that IGO membership directly influences state leaders, who become accustomed to the dispute resolution mechanisms provided by IGOs, and who further become dependent upon IGO networks
which shape the strategic choices states make. The literature has examined
the role IGOs play in providing information, offering opportunities for
communication and meditation with other states, and their influence in
regulating the normative behavior of states around security issues.7 Many
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IGOs are products of major powers and the balance of power within the
international system, yet they retain their own individual ability to shape
state behavior and interests. States who join IGOs are buying into global
governance, which is in part controlled and directed by major powers,
mainly the United States (U.S.). IGOs, however, signal and indicate a
state's willingness to participate in such governance, and further provide
structures for states to interact in the international system. For example,
participating in IGOs may signal to the U.S. that a state is on board with
its leadership, but it also provides opportunity for cooperation with other
states. In other words, the role of IGOs is a mixture of varying types of
influence. On one side IGOs provide an opportunity for hegemons to
funnel power, while on the other IGOs
offer a structured means to govern rela- On one side IGOs
tions in the international system without provide an opportunity
such hegemonic influence. 8 Given that for hegemons to funnel
the hegemon does not intervene in every power, while on the other
conflict or crisis, there is evidence to sug- IGOs offer a structured
gest that IGOs are independent of major means to govern relations
powers, at least for some of the time, and
in the international
work to fill the power vacuum, and thus
system without such
help establish the rules of state interachegemonic influence.
tions and behavior. This paper argues
that it is this influence that has been
unaccounted for in previous examinations of military spending patterns.
The influence ofIGOs does not turn states into pacifists; rather, they
find a reduced need for a robust military. IGOs memberships and participation in global governance work to diminish the attractiveness of high
military budgets in light of additional information gained through repeated
interactions. State leaders face competing demands for limited resources,
as winning coalitions demand state resources in exchange for leadership
support. In order to meet these demands, leaders look for low cost policies
that allow for the simultaneous implementation of policies in other arenas.
Leaders learn that they can substitute high military spending rates for IGO
memberships, as states develop and become accustomed to the pacific influ ence ofIGOs. Domestic winning coalitions demand military spending, but
this has largely been the product of undemocratic regimes and hegemonic
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status. 9 This paper argues that a portion of the costs of providing security
can be offset by participating in global governance, because the information gained from the repeated interactions that IGOs facilitate works to
develop relationships between states and solidify reputations that foster
cooperation and exchange information about capabilities and interests.
The information from IGOs makes it more difficult for domestic political
actors to advocate for high military spending rates, as behavior about other
states disseminates through a country.
To test this hypothesis, I examine the role of IGO membership in
defense spending outcomes using country-year data. I combine the modeling approach employed by recent military spending research, 10 and couple
it with IGO data. The findings indicate that while IGOs work to reduce
military spending, it is on average a small percentage of overall defense
spending. Since IGOs are not created equally, I break down the IGO variable
into security and non-security orientated organizations using Boehmer et al
(2004). I find that it is the non-security organizations that actually reduce
military spending, while security organizations when examined on their own
have no discernable influence. These findings support the hypothesis that,
of all the causal mechanisms identified in the literature that allow IGOs
to influence conflict behavior, it is informational exchanges that work to
decrease tensions and help illuminate domestic political decisions, because
non-security IGOs do not provide their member states with a promise of
a defensive military coalition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly
examine the theoretical underpinnings of the IGO conflict literature. From
there I develop a theoretical framework which argues that IGO membership reduces military spending through the interaction of domestic political
demands, and then derive my hypothesis from this discussion. I then outline
my research design, present my results and conclude with a discussion of
my findings.

THE BENEFITS OF IGO MEMBERSHIP
Liberals, Constructivists, and Realists contest the role ofIGOs in international relations, yet combined they provide a holistic and balanced understanding of how IGOs shape state behavior. Realists downplay the power
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of IGOs to influence state behavior, while Liberals and Constructivists
highlight their influence, albeit in slightly different ways. Liberals argue
that IGOs can, independently of their membership characteristics, shape
the behavior of member states in two general ways. First, IGOs have the
ability to increase opportunities for communication between states by providing a forum for the safe transmission of signals, as well as structures to
mediate their conflicts. 11 IGOs have credibility that states lack, and when
they communicate their interests by threatening sanctions, embargos, or
other types ofleverage, they can effectively mediate conflicts between states
in jeopardy of escalating to a militarized conflict. 12 Second, information
transmission increases transparency between states by forcing them to clarify
their positions in numerous interactions within the structure of the organization, thus reducing uncertainty
between potential adversaries as to Realists downplay the
their intent, interests, and strategies. 13 power of IGOs to influence
This argument is succinctly outlined state behavior, while
in the seminal work of Russett and
Liberals and Constructivists
Oneal (2001), who identify six causal
highlight their influence,
mechanisms that IGOs perform to
albeit in slightly different
help keep the peace between member
states: (1) enforce norms, (2) mediate ways.
among conflict parties, (3) informa- - - - - - - - - - - - - tion conveying = reduced uncertainty, (4) expands nation's concept of
self-interested into long term, ( 5) socialization and shaping norms such as
democratic ones, and (6) generating narratives of mutual identification. A
number of scholars have defended these causal mechanisms with substantial
evidence. 14 In short, a consensus among Liberals has agreed that IGOs
have the ability to 'affect the understanding, environment, and interests of
states. ' 15 While the specifics of the argument evolve, such as those arguing
that IGOs choose their members with the intent of avoiding conflict 16 or
causing conflict 17 , and debates with realists remain, the consistent argument has been that in certain contexts IGOs can have a pacific effect on
state behavior.
While liberals root their theory in the rational choice calculations states
make in response to IGO actions, constructivists argue that IGOs teach
states new behaviors and alter their identities and thus their priorities. 18
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Given that IGOs are formulated and designed to facilitate cooperation
between states, Constructivist arguments are consistent with the position
taken in this paper, that IGO membership has the ability to reorganize the
security needs of the state, and can reduce military spending. IGOs shape
the policy and normative behavior of states, which see the international
community as more conflict-resolution orientated, and who view the use
of military leverage as less acceptable. Constructivists further argue that
these practices produce customs which define acceptable behavior, such as
the norms surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. 19
Realists, who see IGOs as merely an extension of state power, and
as unable to independently shape state behavior, reject all of the above
described Liberal and Constructivist mechanisms. 20 Realists present strong
support for their arguments, as the driving force behind the creation of
many IGOs were major powers, whose motivation was to create institutions
that could manage their international affairs and advance their interests.
Hegemons may be crucial to the creation ofIGOs; however, once created
IGOs can influence and shape state behavior beyond the intention of major
powers. 21 While some debate remains, a consensus has emerged among
many international relations scholars that IGOs shape state behavior.

IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING
Building from this literature, this paper argues that IGOs influence the
amount of resources states choose to allocate toward the military. The causal
mechanisms behind this influence is the role of information exchanges,
facilitated by membership in IGOs. Decisions about military spending
are made by leaders who face competing demands from their winning
coalitions for limited state resources. 22 All executives must confront the
anarchical world, and are thus forced to provide the public good of security, i.e. the protection of the state from internal or external threats. States
utilize militaries to provide the public good of security, but in addition they
also build alliances and join IGOs. This paper posits that IGOs provide a
substitution policy for state leaders, in that they reduce the utility of using
military force to achieve state interests, thus reducing tension between states
and the probability of conflict. States become conditioned to the pacific
mechanisms ofIGOs and utilize these mechanisms to prevent conflict and
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reduce tension, in turn minimizing the pressure to maintain high levels
of military spending. States do not eliminate their militaries nor do they
refrain from conducting modernization efforts or research and development;
rather, the reduced need and utility of the military in the face of demands
for other public goods forces leaders to make tough choices, one of which
is reducing levels of military spending.
States' decision making is dependent on information flows to and from
the executive leadership. Information in an anarchical world is riddled with
falsehoods and misinformation, as states are incentivized to misrepresent
their capabilities and interests. However, states cannot misrepresent long
without consequences, and a great deal can be learned about a nation-state's
interests from observing their behavior. IGOs are a formal setting where
such behavior can be observed, and remains a major forum where the
transmission of information between
states can occur. States offer their IGOs are a formal setting
official position on a variety of issues where state behavior
ranging from economic to social and
can be observed, and
everything in between. While many
remains a major forum
of these positions obfuscate the truth,
where the transmission
many are substantive and can reveal a
.
.
state's economic political securitv or of mformat1on between
'
'
J'
social concerns. For example, Saudi states can occur.
Arabia's motivation to head the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights highlights the misrepresentation states can
engage in given the Saudi's known behavior, but likewise Saudi Arabia's
position on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' production targets reveals another state interest. In some cases the detailed
information can be specifically about military spending. Consider the
Aridean Community's (CAN) Lima 2002 Commitment, where the member states of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela agreed, in
part, to declare the region free from air-to-air missiles and from nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, and made a commitment to eradicate
illicit weapons trafficking and anti-personal landmines. 23 While most of the
weapons being banned were beyond the means or strategic interests of the
member states, weapons trafficking remains a real threat to the stability of
member states. In addition, the agreement called for greater transparency
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in military spending behavior. Over time it is not difficult for states to gain
a somewhat accurate picture of the internal workings of another country on
military spending issues, but all other interests as well, however incomplete
their understanding is.
This information is coupled with the personal relationships that develop
in repeated interactions organized by IGOs. Individual diplomats can build
relationships, and in the very least reputations for being reasonable, accurate,
and honest. While double and triple crosses and other such drama occurs,
the bulk ofinteractions transmit reliable and accurate information. Personal
avenues of information exchanges remain critical and widely used mechanisms that shape policy maker perceptions and understandings of the exact
threat posed by international actors. For example, media reports discussing
various international negotiations and
meetings often discuss the reputation
Beyond the personal
of individual diplomats, often in a posirelationships of
tive light. Some reports are obviously
diplomats, states make
the product of crafty communication
credible commitments
strategies. However, others are successwithin the processes
ful at their jobs because they effectively
governed by IGOs.
communicate. Consider the long time
Saudi diplomat Bandar Bin Sultan, who
maintained his credentials through four presidents as the Ambassador to
the U.S. from 1983-2005. Personal relationships matter in such repeated
interactions, and work to facilitate better understanding between countries.
Beyond the personal relationships of diplomats, states make credible
commitments within the processes governed by IGOs. 24 These credible
commitments work to bolster follow-through in agreements, including
the accuracy and amount of information states provide on their official
positions. It is this information that helps states discern the interests,
position, and motivation of other states. As states gain a more accurate
understanding of other states, their budgetary process becomes better
informed, and executives can make informed choices on where to put their
limited resources. This information may be detailed and useful, and ranges
from the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional Arms Acquisition requiring the exchanging
ofinformation regarding arms purchases,25 to the North Koreans requesting
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food assistance from the United Nations (UN) Food Assistance Program
in September of2015. 26 In the OAS case, states actually know what other
states in the region are doing, to some degree, on arms purchases, while
in the UN case China, Japan, the U.S. and others have a better sense of
domestic problems facing a weak and belligerent rogue state. The point
is that in either case a picture is being transmitted through the information diffusion opportunities offered by IGO structures, diminishing the
possibility that state security planning operates on a worst case scenario.
IGOs facilitate domestic fact-based budgeting, as opposed to fear based,
with fact-based diminishing spending requirements.
Authoritarian leaders are especially prone to this influx of information,
as the bulk of public spending is distributed among the political, economic,
and military elite of the country. While
they do not have the same demands IGO memberships reduce
on their spending choices as demo- the military spending
cratically-elected executives, they are
by having additional
still restrained by their own domestic
information about how
political environment and need to hold
other states are preparing
together a winning coalition requiring
for possible future
distribution of state funds. 27 These
leaders use the information they obtain military action. States
from the international community, and can properly adjust their
rearrange their military spending deci- strategic decisions, as
sions based on the threat assessment opposed to working with
they find in the international security incomplete information.
environment. These information flows
occur in the repeated interactions they
enjoy with countries they have overlapping IGO memberships with.
IGO memberships reduce the military spending by having additional
information about how other states are preparing for possible future military
action. States can properly adjust their strategic decisions, as opposed to
working with incomplete information. As Jervis (1976) has noted, there are
many different types of misperceptions, and while I GOs do not provide total
transparency of other state's military planning, 28 the increased information
they provide is more than the limited and questionable information utilized
in previous state military planning,29 a situation which historically led to
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in military spending behavior. Over time it is not difficult for states to gain
a somewhat accurate picture of the internal workings of another country on
military spending issues, but all other interests as well, however incomplete
their understanding is.
This information is coupled with the personal relationships that develop
in repeated interactions organized by IGOs. Individual diplomats can build
relationships, and in the very least reputations for being reasonable, accurate,
and honest. While double and triple crosses and other such drama occurs,
the bulk ofinteractions transmit reliable and accurate information. Personal
avenues of information exchanges remain critical and widely used mechanisms that shape policy maker perceptions and understandings of the exact
threat posed by international actors. For example, media reports discussing
various international negotiations and
meetings often discuss the reputation
Beyond the personal
ofindividual diplomats, often in a posirelationships of
tive light. Some reports are obviously
diplomats, states make
the product of crafty communication
credible commitments
strategies. However, others are successwithin the processes
ful at their jobs because they effectively
governed by IGOs.
communicate. Consider the long time
Saudi diplomat Bandar Bin Sultan, who
maintained his credentials through four presidents as the Ambassador to
the U.S. from 1983-2005. Personal relationships matter in such repeated
interactions, and work to facilitate better understanding between countries.
Beyond the personal relationships of diplomats, states make credible
commitments within the processes governed by IGOs. 24 These credible
commitments work to bolster follow-through in agreements, including
the accuracy and amount of information states provide on their official
positions. It is this information that helps states discern the interests,
position, and motivation of other states. As states gain a more accurate
understanding of other states, their budgetary process becomes better
informed, and executives can make informed choices on where to put their
limited resources. This information may be detailed and useful, and ranges
from the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional Arms Acquisition requiring the exchanging
ofinformation regarding arms purchases,25 to the North Koreans requesting
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is that in either case a picture is being transmitted through the information diffusion opportunities offered by IGO structures, diminishing the
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with fact-based diminishing spending requirements.
Authoritarian leaders are especially prone to this influx of information,
as the bulk of public spending is distributed among the political, economic,
and military elite of the country. While
they do not have the same demands IGO memberships reduce
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rearrange their military spending deci- strategic decisions, as
sions based on the threat assessment opposed to working with
they find in the international security incomplete information.
environment. These information flows
occur in the repeated interactions they
enjoy with countries they have overlapping IGO memberships with.
IGO memberships reduce the military spending by having additional
information about how other states are preparing for possible future military
action. States can properly adjust their strategic decisions, as opposed to
working with incomplete information. As Jervis (1976) has noted, there are
many different types of misperceptions, and while I GOs do not provide total
transparency of other state's military planning,28 the increased information
they provide is more than the limited and questionable information utilized
in previous state military planning, 29 a situation which historically led to
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overstatements on an adversary's abilities and fueled arms races. Consider
the most conservative of Turkey's security elite, whose tension with Greece
continues to occupy substantial portions of their military planning. Turkey's
recognition as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership unveiled
their military capabilities to Greek policy makers, and created new pathways of information that shaped both Turkey and Greece's policy debates
about how much security to acquire, thus reducing the required amount
of military spending in both countries. Specifically, beyond Greece ending
their veto to Turkey's EU candidacy, Turkish leaders learned more about
Greece's willingness to resolve the Cypriot question peacefully. 30 While
Turkey still considers Greece a threat, Turkish policy leaders are armed with
information obtained though the EU accession process that can inform
their decision making. Information
exchanges can diminish the power of
Turkey's recognition as a
hawks, reduce uncertainty, and result
candidate for European
in more pacific policies being adopted,
Union (EU) membership
given that failure to pursue an aggressive
unveiled their military
security policy may prove disastrous. 31
capabilities to Greek
While some information sharing may
policy makers, and
empower hawks and confirm suspicions,
created new pathways of
it is the contention of this paper that
more often information sharing has a
information that shaped
pacific
effect, as both states are lookboth Turkey and Greece's
ing to produce only as much security
policy debates.
as needed given the other spending
demands on the state.
The sharing of such information occurs through the routinized interactions of state leaders within the structures ofIGOs. 32 While the structures
of IGOs promote competition and may amplify policy differences, they
also allow for bargaining space to be created for cooperation and compromise, which opens the door to a reduction of tension and an avoidance of
conflict. IGOs do not eliminate these conflicts; rather, they provide the
structures to reduce conflict as well as tension. 33 By providing additional
information, states can more effectively plan their security choices. The
interactions between states within IGO work to clarify positions and dispel
myths about state interests and ideas about action. 34 Given that few state
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leaders view militarized conflict as a risk-free and productive avenue to
achieve their ends, such exchanges will reduce the necessity for high levels
of military spending.
More than simple information exchanges, many IGOs offer the opportunity for states to engage in structured discussions and agreements on
important and vital security issues and explore possible actions to take in
response to them. This exchange of signals, widely theorized and discussed
in the literature, provides the kind of exchange and communication that
can alter the internal decision-making processes of states. The credible
commitments and leverage mechanisms that enforce compliance of agreements are important for governing state behavior, but such endeavors
start with repeated interaction and information exchanges. Even the most
contentious relationships can benefit
from the exchange of signals. Consider On their own, the conflict
the current conflict between Iran, the resolution and pacific
U.S. and several Western states over mechanisms of IGOs
the Iranian nuclear program. Current may not shape military
sanctions 35 implemented by the United spending allocation by
Nations Security Council (UNSC)
states; however, such
are to be lifted only when Iran ceases
decisions are not solely
suspected enrichment activity under
the product of foreign
the recently announced deal between
affairs, they are deeply
the U.S., Russia, France, England, and
Iran. Clearly, the adversarial states in rooted in domestic

institutions.
nicated their positions without resorting - - - - - - - - - - - - •
to a direct military encounter. 36 This example illustrates the ways in which
IGOs serve as a forum for communication for even the most hostile of
dyads. Moreover, iflranians fulfill their portion of the agreement and allow
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into their nuclear
facilities, they can expect certain behaviors from the U .S and the IAEA. In
this case, both countries would not have had to allocate as many resources
to the military if the structures of the IAEA and its information transmission
capacity were not in place. It is the exchange of information within IGOs
that allows the construction and implementation of such arrangements.
On their own, the conflict resolution and pacific mechanisms ofIGOs
this conflict have successfully commu-
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as needed given the other spending
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The sharing of such information occurs through the routinized interactions of state leaders within the structures ofIGOs. 32 While the structures
of IGOs promote competition and may amplify policy differences, they
also allow for bargaining space to be created for cooperation and compromise, which opens the door to a reduction of tension and an avoidance of
conflict. IGOs do not eliminate these conflicts; rather, they provide the
structures to reduce conflict as well as tension. 33 By providing additional
information, states can more effectively plan their security choices. The
interactions between states within IGO work to clarify positions and dispel
myths about state interests and ideas about action. 34 Given that few state
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leaders view militarized conflict as a risk-free and productive avenue to
achieve their ends, such exchanges will reduce the necessity for high levels
of military spending.
More than simple information exchanges, many IGOs offer the opportunity for states to engage in structured discussions and agreements on
important and vital security issues and explore possible actions to take in
response to them. This exchange of signals, widely theorized and discussed
in the literature, provides the kind of exchange and communication that
can alter the internal decision-making processes of states. The credible
commitments and leverage mechanisms that enforce compliance of agreements are important for governing state behavior, but such endeavors
start with repeated interaction and information exchanges. Even the most
contentious relationships can benefit
from the exchange of signals. Consider On their own, the conflict
the current conflict between Iran, the resolution and pacific
U.S. and several Western states over mechanisms of IGOs
the Iranian nuclear program. Current may not shape military
sanctions 35 implemented by the United spending allocation by
Nations Security Council (UNSC) states; however, such
are to be lifted only when Iran ceases
decisions are not solely
suspected enrichment activity under
the product of foreign
the recently announced deal between
affairs, they are deeply
the U.S., Russia, France, England, and
Iran. Clearly, the adversarial states in rooted in domestic

institutions.
nicated their positions without resorting - - - - - - - - - - - - to a direct military encounter. 36 This example illustrates the ways in which
IGOs serve as a forum for communication for even the most hostile of
dyads. Moreover, iflranians fulfill their portion of the agreement and allow
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into their nuclear
facilities, they can expect certain behaviors from the U .S and the IAEA. In
this case, both countries would not have had to allocate as many resources
to the military if the structures of the IAEA and its information transmission
capacity were not in place. It is the exchange of information within IGOs
that allows the construction and implementation of such arrangements.
On their own, the conflict resolution and pacific mechanisms ofIGOs
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may not shape military spending allocation by states; however, such decisions are not solely the product of foreign affairs; they are deeply rooted in
domestic institutions. 37 State leaders face competing demands for limited
state funds, as their winning coalitions demand state resources in exchange
for leadership support. Leaders work to maintain the support needed to
retain office either electorally in democracies or via the distribution of private
goods authoritarian leaders must deliver to maintain power. 38 This cannot
be achieved solely by providing security to the public; thus, leaders pursue
the simultaneous implementation of policies in multiple arenas (education,
transportation, health care, etc) in order to maintain support, and are under
great pressure to do so. Leaders work to implement as many successful
policies as possible, and thus are motivated to pursue low cost policies that
achieve their goal ofretaining the support of winning coalitions. As states
develop and become accustomed to the pacific mechanisms ofIGOs, leaders
learn they can substitute high military spending rates for other goods that
bolster the support of their winning coalitions. 39 As argued above, the costs
of providing security for the state can be offset by participating in global
governance, developing relationships and reputations that foster cooperation, and resolving conflicts before they escalate through the mechanisms
ofIGOs, as such components ofIGOs bolster security and reduce the need
for high rates of military spending. Forces such as a rivalry or war clearly
still retain the power to increase military spending rates in the presence of
IGO membership, as the power of IGO memberships cannot overcome
all security considerations or threats. However, domestic pressure for state
resources simplifies where spending can be cut. IGO memberships clarify for
leaders where security policy can be shifted to meet the other demands on
the state. The argument presented here is not that IGOs work to eliminate
militaries or fully substitute their role in providing security for the state, but
rather that IGOs lower the requirement for defense spending, which states
take advantage of, given the competing demands leaders face to allocate
state resources to other public and private goods in order to retain power.
The international relations literature asserts that there are a large
number ofinfluences on military spending. 40 These influences are not zerosum; they collectively culminate into a state's decisions on the size of the
military budget. 41 Formally, the demand for military expenditures can be
expressed most simply as M = F(S, NS, I), where S= security environment,

50

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016

r

IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING

NS=non-security factors, such as wealth and domestic politics, and !=inertia,
which captures the lagged influence of the previous year's budget and
country specific effects. To date the S portion of the equation has been
under-theorized, in that IGO memberships have been left out of previous
analyses. Past contributions to the literature, such as Smith (1989), Flores
(2011), and others have modeled security in a limited fashion, such as S=
F(AS, ES, IS), with AS=allied spending, ES= enemy spending, and IS=
security threats. This paper expands on the field's understanding of what is
considered in S by adding IGO memberships to the equation. This addition
is important given the ability ofIGOs to alter the security environment of
states, as detailed above. States with strong economies, engaged in a militarized conflict, or facing domestic insurgencies all can expect their defense
budgets to vary. While IGOs play a role in the defense budget process,
they are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for defense budgets to
vary. In other words, IGOs can reduce military spending, but they are not
required to reduce military spending, as other factors play a larger role in
the defense budget process. However, the sufficient condition does not
hold in some circumstances, such as states in full scale war. While some
states may be excluded from some IGOs for defense policy decisions, the
bulk of IGOs do not prevent membership based on high defense spending rates. 42 The more IGOs a state is a member of, the greater number of
joint memberships a state has with the nations of the world, and the more
information exchanges, however small, a country will engage in with other
nations. In total, the above literature leads to the following hypothesis,
which guides this study:

HI: States who are members of intergovernmental organizations will
reduce their military spending) relative to states that retain fewer IGO
membership.

TESTING THE ARGUMENT
The data utilized in this study is drawn from Bohmelt and Bove's (2014)
analysis of military spending rates, who gathered their base model from
Nordhaus et al (2012). 43 These two projects utilized country-year panel
data for the 1952-2000 time period and represent the current consensus
among IR scholars on how to model military spending. The major addition
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take advantage of, given the competing demands leaders face to allocate
state resources to other public and private goods in order to retain power.
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states, as detailed above. States with strong economies, engaged in a militarized conflict, or facing domestic insurgencies all can expect their defense
budgets to vary. While IGOs play a role in the defense budget process,
they are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for defense budgets to
vary. In other words, IGOs can reduce military spending, but they are not
required to reduce military spending, as other factors play a larger role in
the defense budget process. However, the sufficient condition does not
hold in some circumstances, such as states in full scale war. While some
states may be excluded from some IGOs for defense policy decisions, the
bulk of IGOs do not prevent membership based on high defense spending rates. 42 The more IGOs a state is a member of, the greater number of
joint memberships a state has with the nations of the world, and the more
information exchanges, however small, a country will engage in with other
nations. In total, the above literature leads to the following hypothesis,
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of this project is an analysis of the role IGOs play in determining military
expenditures, which further limits the temporal scope of this project to
1965-2000. 44
The dependent variable for this study is the share of GDP allocated to
the defense budget, measured in constant US Dollars, with a transformation
to account for purchasing power parity and log. 45 The data is drawn from
both SIP RI and Correlates of War (COW) Project, with data from SIPRI
providing the 1988-2000 period, and 1965-1987 period being drawn from
the COW data. The defense expenditure data contains all financial resources
available to the military in time of war, and contains all resources that
could be deployed in a time of conflict, regardless of their active or reserve
status. 46 Military spending data has been criticized for being inaccurate
and difficult to properly measure given
the general withholding of information
Capturing state
states engage in around their security
involvement in an IGO
planning. Lebovic (1999) criticized the
has several options. The
COW dataset, which builds from both
one employed here is
the SIPRI and the U.S. Arms Control
a simple measurement
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA, now
of membership, as all
Bureau of Arms Control). Lebovic's
IGO memberships have
main concern is use of the COW dataset
the ability to deliver
in studies that focus on limited samples
arranged by year or geographic region.
information regardless of
He concluded, however, that the use of
their focus.
the dataset was appropriate for larger
samples, such as the one employed
here. 47 The argument that Lebovic (1999) makes is that while specific values
of defense spending may be inaccurate, the general directionality is correct.
Therefore, this research, which aims only at uncovering directionality, is
not harmed by this set of issues in the data.
Capturing state involvement in an IGO has several options. The one
employed here is a simple measurement of membership, as all IGO memberships have the ability to deliver information regardless of their focus.
The independent variable of interest, Total I GO Membership, captures the
number ofIGO memberships a state holds in a given year. 48 In calculating
this variable, observer and associate memberships are eliminated, making
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Total IGO Membership simply the total number of full IGO memberships
a given state had in a given year. For example, the U.S. was a member of
96 organizations out of a possible 337 organizations in 1993, making
the value for Total IGO Membership for the U.S. in 1993 96. Total IGO
Membership captures the level of integration of a state into I GO networks,
in comparison to other states and over time, and considers the growth of
IGOs in the international system. 49 The military alliances of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact are removed from the sample, and added to the alliance
data. That integration serves as the undercurrent to the theoretical argument presented above; as states become more and more integrated into
the international community, the number of ties they have with other
states in the IGO context produces more options for resolving conflicts,
and thereby reshapes the security planning of the state. States join a variety
of types of organizations, and each of them, it is argued here, have the
capacity to deliver information. While some IGOs may be better positioned
to transmit information, each IGO offers states an opportunity to publicly
position themselves on a range of issues, and thus transmit information to
other states, and vice versa.
While I argue that all IGOs transmit information, it is clear that not
all IGOs are created equal with regards to their capacity and institutionalization.50 This therefore constitutes a major drawback to Total IGO
Membership, as it does not distinguish between IGOs. I argue that security
IGOs are particularly well positioned to transmit information concerning
critical security issues that further facilitate the reduction of military spending. This study therefore parses out the varying influence security IGOs
have on state military spending decisions. To do so, this study borrows
criteria from Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) to identify these
security IGOs. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) suggest that
highly institutionalized security IGOs are more able to shape the security
behavior of states and contain the following three elements: 1) a high level of
institutionalization, 2) member cohesion, and 3) a specific security mandate.
Further, they demonstrate that these highly institutionalized IGOs with
security mandates do more to reduce the probability of conflict between
member states than organizations without such structures, as they possess
the "organs or mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, or adjudication aimed
at conflict resolution and the enforcement of organizational decisions." 51
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employed here is a simple measurement of membership, as all IGO memberships have the ability to deliver information regardless of their focus.
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Total IGO Membership simply the total number of full IGO memberships
a given state had in a given year. For example, the U.S. was a member of
96 organizations out of a possible 337 organizations in 1993, making
the value for Total IGO Membership for the U.S. in 1993 96. Total IGO
Membership captures the level of integration of a state into I GO networks,
in comparison to other states and over time, and considers the growth of
IGOs in the international system. 49 The military alliances of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact are removed from the sample, and added to the alliance
data. That integration serves as the undercurrent to the theoretical argument presented above; as states become more and more integrated into
the international community, the number of ties they have with other
states in the IGO context produces more options for resolving conflicts,
and thereby reshapes the security planning of the state. States join a variety
of types of organizations, and each of them, it is argued here, have the
capacity to deliver information. While some IGOs may be better positioned
to transmit information, each IGO offers states an opportunity to publicly
position themselves on a range of issues, and thus transmit information to
other states, and vice versa.
While I argue that all IGOs transmit information, it is clear that not
all IGOs are created equal with regards to their capacity and institutionalization. 50 This therefore constitutes a major drawback to Total IGO
Membership, as it does not distinguish between IGOs. I argue that security
IGOs are particularly well positioned to transmit information concerning
critical security issues that further facilitate the reduction of military spending. This study therefore parses out the varying influence security IGOs
have on state military spending decisions. To do so, this study borrows
criteria from Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) to identify these
security IGOs. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) suggest that
highly institutionalized security IGOs are more able to shape the security
behavior of states and contain the following three elements: 1) a high level of
institutionalization, 2) member cohesion, and 3) a specific security mandate.
Further, they demonstrate that these highly institutionalized IGOs with
security mandates do more to reduce the probability of conflict between
member states than organizations without such structures, as they possess
the "organs or mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, or adjudication aimed
at conflict resolution and the enforcement of organizational decisions." 51
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These structured organizations contain assemblies, secretariats, bureaucracies to implement policy, formal rules and procedures, and have security
cooperation as an integral part of the organization's founding documents. 52
Interventionist organizations have the above elements combined with
mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and adjudication and other means
to coerce state decisions, the means to enforce organizational decisions and
norms, and a specific security mandate. These elements oflnterventionists or
Security IGOs constitute the institutionalization referenced above, as these
IGOs have the capacity, resources, and bureaucratic capacity that have the
ability and means to effectively communicate private information. For an
IGO to have a security mandate, the founding documents must indicate a
security intention for the organization. 53 This project argues that all IGOs
have some ability to transmit information, but security IGOs are better
positioned to communicate critical information that ultimately shape state
security spending decisions.
The variable, Total Security IGOs, is a simple count variable calculated
by summing the number of security organizations a state is a member of in
a given year. 54 To control for the influence of non-security IGOs, a modified version of Total IGO Membership (Total Non-Security IGOs) minus
the Total Security IGO variable is added to the model to evaluate which
type of organization influence military spending. The two variables, Total
Security IGO and Total Non-Security IGO, correlate at .82.
I utilize the modeling strategy employed by Bohmelt and Bove (2014)
who build on Nordhaus et. al. (2012 ), whose base model is as follows:

reduction in military spending, with empirical results providing support, and
is drawn from the polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). 56 The share of
the overall GDP that is related to trade is the simple product of those two
figures, which is included to capture the ranking of the country in a given
year relative to the rest of the world. Given that economic power is a major
predictor of military spending, it is also included in the model. Having both
captures economic changes from year to year, and also the relative influence
a country will have in the international system. The data for both share
an overall GDP drawn from the Gleditsch data. 57 Given that neighboring
countries often pose the largest security threat, a measure of contiguity is
also included. 58 The Number of States in the System, as Bohmelt and Bove
(2014) state, "simply counts the number of existing countries in a given
year." 59 To account for the influence of other countries military spending
levels, two separate measures capturing the military spending of foes and
allies are added to the model, both drawn from Nordhaus et al (2012).
These figures categorize states as friends or foes based on the similarity of
alliance portfolios, with the top half of portfolios being considered friends,
and the bottom half foes. 60 Lastly, a lagged dependent variable is included
in the model to account for bureaucratic inertia. 61 All states in which there
are tens years of data are included in the model. 62 I use pooled time-series
data which includes all states for which data are available, which amounts
to over 4400 observations for the time period of 1965-2000. 63

Military Spending (ln) = Total IGO Memebership +Peace Years+ democracy+ trade/GDP+ Contiguity+ allies+ GDP/World GDP+ number ofstates
in system + GDP(logged) + military spending foes+ military spending allies
+ lagged dependent variable + error term

Three modeling strategies are utilized to estimate the relationship between
military spending and IGOs. The main modeling strategy utilizes PraisWinsten regression \vith correlated Panels Corrected standard errors (PCSE)
to account for an AR-1 process found in this time series data on account
of the lagged dependent variable. To ensure robustness, I also used cluster
analysis, fixed effects, and regional indictors. Tables 2 and 3 display the
results from the nine models run. Model 1 is the base model without either
IGO variable. Model 2 contains the simple count of Total IGO memberships as the primary independent variable, which produces a negative and
significant coefficient. Model 3 removes the Total IGO Membership Count
variables, and adds the disaggregated IGO variables, Total Security IGOs

Military Spending (ln) is converted into constant US Dollars measured
with purchasing power parity and log transformed, and is represented as a
share of GDP. 55 Peace Years counts the number of years since a state was
involved in any fatal MID. Fatal MIDs are preferred to wars, as they are more
common and capture the ongoing security threats of the state (Lake 2009;
Nordhaus et al 2012). Democracy has been widely theorized to result in a
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These structured organizations contain assemblies, secretariats, bureaucracies to implement policy, formal rules and procedures, and have security
cooperation as an integral part of the organization's founding documents.s 2
Interventionist organizations have the above elements combined with
mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and adjudication and other means
to coerce state decisions, the means to enforce organizational decisions and
norms, and a specific security mandate. These elements oflnterventionists or
Security IGOs constitute the institutionalization referenced above, as these
IGOs have the capacity, resources, and bureaucratic capacity that have the
ability and means to effectively communicate private information. For an
IGO to have a security mandate, the founding documents must indicate a
security intention for the organization. 53 This project argues that all I GOs
have some ability to transmit information, but security IGOs are better
positioned to communicate critical information that ultimately shape state
security spending decisions.
The variable, Total Security IGOs, is a simple count variable calculated
by summing the number of security organizations a state is a member of in
a given year. 54 To control for the influence of non-security IGOs, a modified version of Total IGO Membership (Total Non-Security IGOs) minus
the Total Security IGO variable is added to the model to evaluate which
type of organization influence military spending. The two variables, Total
Security IGO and Total Non-Security IGO, correlate at .82.
I utilize the modeling strategy employed by Bohmelt and Bove (2014)
who build on Nordhaus et. al. (2012), whose base model is as follows:

reduction in military spending, with empirical results providing support, and
is drawn from the polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). 56 The share of
the overall GDP that is related to trade is the simple product of those two
figures, which is included to capture the ranking of the country in a given
year relative to the rest of the world. Given that economic power is a major
predictor of military spending, it is also included in the model. Having both
captures economic changes from year to year, and also the relative influence
a country will have in the international system. The data for both share
an overall GDP drawn from the Gleditsch data.s 7 Given that neighboring
countries often pose the largest security threat, a measure of contiguity is
also included. 58 The Number of States in the System, as Bohmelt and Bove
(2014) state, "simply counts the number of existing countries in a given
year. " 59 To account for the influence of other countries military spending
levels, two separate measures capturing the military spending of foes and
allies are added to the model, both drawn from Nordhaus et al (2012).
These figures categorize states as friends or foes based on the similarity of
alliance portfolios, with the top half of portfolios being considered friends,
and the bottom half foes. 60 Lastly, a lagged dependent variable is included
in the model to account for bureaucratic inertia. 61 All states in which there
are tens years of data are included in the model. 62 I use pooled time-series
data which includes all states for which data are available, which amounts
to over 4400 observations for the time period of 1965-2000. 63

Military Spending (ln) = Total IGO Memebership +Peace Years+ democracy+ trade/GDP+ Contiguity+ allies+ GDP/World GDP+ number ofstates
in system + GDP(logged) + military spending foes+ military spending allies
+ lagged dependent variable + error term

Three modeling strategies are utilized to estimate the relationship between
military spending and IGOs. The main modeling strategy utilizes PraisWinsten regression \vith correlated Panels Corrected standard errors (PCSE)
to account for an AR-1 process found in this time series data on account
of the lagged dependent variable. To ensure robustness, I also used cluster
analysis, fixed effects, and regional indictors. Tables 2 and 3 display the
results from the nine models run. Model 1 is the base model without either
IGO variable. Model 2 contains the simple count of Total IGO memberships as the primary independent variable, which produces a negative and
significant coefficient. Model 3 removes the Total IGO Membership Count
variables, and adds the disaggregated IGO variables, Total Security IGOs

Military Spending (ln) is converted into constant US Dollars measured
with purchasing power parity and log transformed, and is represented as a
share of GDP.ss Peace Years counts the number of years since a state was
involved in any fatal MID. Fatal MIDs are preferred to wars, as they are more
common and capture the ongoing security threats of the state (Lake 2009;
Nordhaus et al 2012). Democracy has been widely theorized to result in a
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Table 2: IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000

Table 1: Total IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000
Variable

Model 1
PCSE
No IGO Var
Base Model

Model 2
PCSE
IGOs

Model 3
PCSE IGO
Disaggregated

Model 4
PCSE only
Security IGOs

Variable

Model 6
Regions

Model 7
Dropped Highly
Integrated States

Model 8
Fixed Effects

Security IGOs

-.003 (.002)

-.002 (.002)

-.004 (.002)

Non Security IGOs

-.001" (.0007)

-.001* (.0006

-.001 ** (.0004)

Peace Years

-.0002 (.0002)

-.0003" (.0001)

-.0003" (.006)

Trade/GDP

.004 (.003)

.008* (.003)

.006" ( .003)

-.0009*
(.0004)

Regime Type

-.003** (.001)

-.003*** (.0009)

-.002** (.0007)

Contiguity

.002 (.001)

.005 (.001)

.001 .001

Model 5
Only Non
Security
IGOs

-.001 ***
(.0004)

Total IGO
Membership
Security
IGOs

-.001
(.002)

Non
Security
IGOs

-.001 *
(.0006)

-.006**
(.002)

-.0004*
(.0001)

-.0002
(.0001)

-.0003"
(.0001)

-.0003*
(.0001)

-.0003*
(.0001)

Allies

-.0002 (.001)

.0005 (.001)

.002 .001

GDP-Share

.400 (.270)

-.759 (.532)

.323 (.245)

Trade/GDP

.004
(.003)

.006*
(.0031)

.007*
( .003)

.006*
(.003)

.005*
(.003)

GDP (In)

.099*** (.013)

.098*** (.014)

.100*** (.006)
.043**

-.003**
(.0009)

-.003**
.0009

-.003**
(.001)

Spending Foes

.032 (.025)

-.004***
(.0009)

-.003***
(.0009)

.021 (.024)

Regime
Type

Spending Friends

-.001 (.008)

-.006 (.008)

.044 (.006)

Contiguity

.002
(.001)

.004*
(.001)

.004*
(.001)

.003*
(.001)

.003*
(.0016)

North America

-.002 (.04)

South America

-.026 (.027)

Allies

-.0001
(.001)

.0004
(.001)

.0002
.001

.0005
(.001)

-.0001
(.001)

Europe

.013 (.029)

GDP-Share

.273
(.226)

.124
(.228)

.159
(.231)

.124
(.231)

.252
(.224)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-.013 (.029)

Middle East

.092** (.28)

GDP (In)

.082***
(.012)

.093***
(.013)

.092***
(.013)

.09***
(.013)

.087***
( .012)

Asia

-.001 (.020)

Lagged DV

.905*** (.010)

.912*** (.Oll)

.898*** (.005)

Spending
Foes

.030
(.024)

.028
(.023)

.027
( .023)

.03
(.024)

.032
(.024)

Constant

-.560 (403)

-.684 (.419)

-.788** (.266)

Spending
Friends

-.007
(.008)

-.006
(.0085)

-.007
.008

-.005
(.008)

-.006
(.008)

R2

.97

.97

.97

N

4492

4212

4492

Lagged DV

.919***
(.Oll)

.915
(.Oll)

.915***
(.Oll)

.916***
(.Oll)

.918***
(.Oll)

Constant

-.615
( .403)

-.621
(.3930)

-.589
(.391)

-.618
(.396)

-.655
( .402)

R2

.97

.97

.97

.97

.97

N

4641

4492

4492

4492

4492

Peace Years

***p s.001 **p s.01 *ps .05 "ps .10
Coefficient (Standard Error)

***p s.001 **p s.01 *ps .05 "ps .10
Coefficient (Standard Error)
tFor Model 5 GDP per capita is switched out for a logged GDP variable
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Table 2: IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000

Table 1: Total IGO Membership
and Defense Burden 1965-2000
Variable

Model 1
PCSE
No IGO Var
Base Model

Model 2
PCSE
IGOs

Model 3
PCSEIGO
Disaggregated

Model 4
PCSE only
Security IGOs

Variable

Model 6
Regions

Model 7
Dropped Highly
Integrated States

Model 8
Fixed Effects

Security IGOs

-.003 (.002)

-.002 (.002)

-.004 (.002)

Non Security IGOs

-.001 A (.0007)

-.001 * (.0006

-.001 ** (.0004)

Peace Years

-.0002 (.0002)

-.0003A (.0001)

-.0003A (.006)

Trade/GDP

.004 (.003)

.008* (.003)

.006A (.003)

-.0009*
(.0004)

Regime Type

-.003** (.001)

-.003*** (.0009)

-.002** (.0007)

Contiguity

.002 (.001)

.005 (.001)

.001 .001

Model 5
Only Non
Security
IGOs

-.001 ***
(.0004)

Total IGO
Membership
Security
IGOs

-.001
(.002)

Non
Security
IGOs

-.001 *
(.0006)

-.006**
(.002)

-.0004*
( .0001)

-.0002
(.0001)

-.0003A
(.0001)

-.0003*
(.0001)

-.0003*
(.0001)

Allies

-.0002 (.001)

.0005 (.001)

.002 .001

GDP-Share

.400 (.270)

-.759 (.532)

.323 (.245)

Trade/GDP

.004
(.003)

.006*
(.0031)

.007*
(.003)

.006*
(.003)

.005*
( .003)

GDP(ln)

.099*** (.013)

.098*** (.014)

.100*** (.006)

-.003**
(.0009)

-.003**
.0009

-.003**
( .001)

-.003***
(.0009)

.021 (.024)

.043**

-.004***
(.0009)

Spending Foes

.032 (.025)

Regime
Type

Spending Friends

-.001 (.008)

-.006 (.008)

.044 (.006)

Contiguity

.002
( .001)

.004*
(.001)

.004*
(.001)

.003*
( .001)

.003*
(.0016)

North America

-.002 (.04)

South America

-.026 (.027)

Allies

-.0001
(.001)

.0004
(.001)

.0002
.001

.0005
(.001)

-.0001
(.001)

Europe

.013 (.029)

GDP-Share

.273
(.226)

.124
(.228)

.159
(.231)

.124
(.231)

.252
(.224)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-.013 (.029)

Middle East

.092** (.28)

GDP (In)

.082***
(.012)

.093***
(.013)

.092***
(.013)

.09***
(.013)

.087***
(.012)

Asia

-.001 (.020)

Lagged DV

.905*** (.010)

.912*** (.Oll)

.898*** (.005)

Spending
Foes

.030
(.024)

.028
(.023)

.027
(.023)

.03
(.024)

.032
(.024)

Constant

-.560 (403)

-.684 (.419)

-.788** (.266)

Spending
Friends

-.007
(.008)

-.006
(.0085)

-.007
.008

-.005
(.008)

-.006
(.008)

R2

.97

.97

.97

N

4492

4212

4492

Lagged DV

.919***
(.Oll)

.915
(.Oll)

.915***
( .Oll)

.916***
(.Oll)

.918***
(.Oll)

Constant

-.615
(.403)

-.621
(.3930)

-.589
( .391)

-.618
(.396)

-.655
(.402)

R2

.97

.97

.97

.97

.97

4641

4492

4492

4492

4492

Peace Years

N

***p

~.001

**p

~.01 *p~

.05

AP~

.10

Coefficient (Standard Error)

***p ~.001 **p ~.01 *p~ .05 AP~ .10
Coefficient (Standard Error)
tFor Model 5 GDP per capita is switched out for a logged GDP variable
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and Total Non-security IGOs. The results indicate that it is the non-security
IGOs that have a negative influence on military spending, while security
IGOs have a positive but non-significant influence on defense spending
rates. Models 4 and 5 each profile the security IGO and non-security IGO
membership variables, with each coefficient being negative and significant,
indicating that while the non-security IGO variables remain consistent
from model 3, the security IGOs variable switches direction and becomes
negative and significant. Total Security IGOs and Total Non-security IGOs
Count correlate at the .82 level.
Drawing on the results contained in model 3, the Clarify program64
was used to produce fixed effects and offer a better understanding of the
influence of the variables of interest on military spending. The results
suggest the average state has a less than 1 percent reduction of military
spending, as they move from the lowest to the mean value in non-security
IGOs. In other words, a state with both the average military spending
rate and average number of non-security IGOs has a .7 percent reduction
in military spending in a given year based on what the findings of model
3 suggest. States with the average military spending rate who have the
highest number of non-security IGOs reduce their military budgets by
2 percent. In substantive terms, this model indicates that a country such
as Spain, the country with the closest to the average defense spending in
2012, would reduce their military spending by US $807 Million (2012)
a year if they had the average number of non-security IGO memberships.65 Given that Spain is more integrated than the average country in
the international network of IGOs, that figure is likely higher based on
the models' findings. The suggestion from the model is that the influence
that non-security IGOs have, while a small percentage, could constitute
a substantial sum for many countries. Take Jamaica in 1996, for example,
whose economy was in the tenth percentile of the sample, was member of
16.6 percent of the active IGOs that year, and saved nearly $17 million
dollars, a substantial sum for a nation of less than three million people.
Such funds may have been utilized to tackle social issues such as education
or health care, resulting in a measurable increase in the standard of living,
or amounting to a de facto tax cut. On the other side of the spectrum, the
Netherlands, whose economy in 1996 was in the 90th percentile for the
sample, held memberships in 3lpercent of active organizations, resulting
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Figure 1: First Differences for Security and Non-Security IGOs
Security IGOs ~
Non-Sec IGOs
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in a calculated savings of 2.6 billion or 24 percent of their defense. 66 The
average country by both economic size and IGO membership saved over
$133 million dollars in military spending a year, while countries in the 90th
percentile of economic size saved over $2.1 billion a year. 67 These results
suggest a strong negative relationship between membership in IGOs and
military spending, and provides support for Hypothesis 1, which suggests
that non-security IGO memberships lead to a reduction in militarization.
Figure 1, built from model 3, captures the first differences graphically, and
indicates the strong decline in military spending levels as states increase the
value of non-security IGOs.
Table 2 examines models that add regional indicators to the analysis.
Model 6 is an amended version of model 3, adding regional indicators to
the modeling. 68 Only the Middle East variable was significant, and its positive coefficient suggests that relative to the reference category, suggesting
that Middle Eastern nations were more likely to have higher rates of military spending compared to the other regions. Further, the coefficient for
non-security IGOs falls from a significance level of .025 in model 3 to .07
in model 6, indicating that some of the influence ofIGOs can be in part
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and Total Non-security IGOs. The results indicate that it is the non-security
IGOs that have a negative influence on military spending, while security
IGOs have a positive but non-significant influence on defense spending
rates. Models 4 and 5 each profile the security IGO and non-security IGO
membership variables, with each coefficient being negative and significant,
indicating that while the non-security IGO variables remain consistent
from model 3, the security IGOs variable switches direction and becomes
negative and significant. Total Security IGOs and Total Non-security IGOs
Count correlate at the .82 level.
Drawing on the results contained in model 3, the Clarify program64
was used to produce fixed effects and offer a better understanding of the
influence of the variables of interest on military spending. The results
suggest the average state has a less than 1 percent reduction of military
spending, as they move from the lowest to the mean value in non-security
IGOs. In other words, a state with both the average military spending
rate and average number of non -security I GOs has a .7 percent reduction
in military spending in a given year based on what the findings of model
3 suggest. States with the average military spending rate who have the
highest number of non-security IGOs reduce their military budgets by
2 percent. In substantive terms, this model indicates that a country such
as Spain, the country with the closest to the average defense spending in
2012, would reduce their military spending by US $807 Million (2012)
a year if they had the average number of non-security IGO memberships.65 Given that Spain is more integrated than the average country in
the international network of IGOs, that figure is likely higher based on
the models' findings. The suggestion from the model is that the influence
that non-security IGOs have, while a small percentage, could constitute
a substantial sum for many countries. Take Jamaica in 1996, for example,
whose economy was in the tenth percentile of the sample, was member of
16.6 percent of the active IGOs that year, and saved nearly $17 million
dollars, a substantial sum for a nation of less than three million people.
Such funds may have been utilized to tackle social issues such as education
or health care, resulting in a measurable increase in the standard of living,
or amounting to a de facto tax cut. On the other side of the spectrum, the
Netherlands, whose economy in 1996 was in the 90th percentile for the
sample, held memberships in 3lpercent of active organizations, resulting
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Figure 1: First Differences for Security and Non-Security IGOs
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in a calculated savings of 2.6 billion or 24 percent of their defense. 66 The
average country by both economic size and IGO membership saved over
$133 million dollars in military spending a year, while countries in the 90th
percentile of economic size saved over $2.1 billion a year. 67 These results
suggest a strong negative relationship between membership in IGOs and
military spending, and provides support for Hypothesis 1, which suggests
that non-security IGO memberships lead to a reduction in militarization.
Figure 1, built from model 3, captures the first differences graphically, and
indicates the strong decline in military spending levels as states increase the
value of non-security IGOs.
Table 2 examines models that add regional indicators to the analysis.
Model 6 is an amended version of model 3, adding regional indicators to
the modeling. 68 Only the Middle East variable was significant, and its positive coefficient suggests that relative to the reference category, suggesting
that Middle Eastern nations were more likely to have higher rates of military spending compared to the other regions. Further, the coefficient for
non-security IGOs falls from a significance level of .025 in model 3 to .07
in model 6, indicating that some of the influence ofIGOs can be in part
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explained by regional characteristics. Model 7 examines this premise by
removing the most integrated states 69 in the dataset and re-running model
3. In this scenario, the results are consistent with model 3, as non-security
IGOs having a negative and significant influence on military spending
rates. 70 Model 8 is a fixed-effects model that produces results consistent
with model 3. Further, alternative sets of control variables did not alter the
results. I dropped peace years and added a simple count ofMIDs in a given
year, added civil wars, regional instability (which is a count of civil wars
and MIDs occurring in neighboring states), rivalry, a Cold War dummy,
and major power, all which did not alter the results in any significant
way. Further, I split the alliance variable into major power alliances (U.S.,
Russia/Soviet Union, France, UK, China) and non-major power alliances,
with the results that were consistent with model 3, and in a model not
reported here dropped alliances all together with results consistent with
model 3 as well. This indicates that the influence of alliances is diminished
with the presence ofIGOs. Further, there is evidence from the models to
suggest that even while controlling for alliances with major powers, that
non-security IGOs work to reduce military spending. These findings help
illustrate how IGOs are important factors in military spending decisions.
Tests for panel unit roots indicated stationary data. 71 Lastly, cluster analysis
on standard errors was used with results consistent with model 3. In all,
the data was not sensitive to alterations and the findings of model three
were consistently with the robustness checks utilized.

CONCLUSION
This research contributes to the literature by starting a conversation about
the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of how IGO memberships
shape state decision making around a critical component of state behavior.
This research suggests that membership in IGOs, specifically non-security
IGOs, reduces military spending rates. As states increase the number ofIGO
memberships, they reduce, albeit in small numbers, the size of their military
budgets. States use the information gained from repeated IGO interactions
to inform their understanding of the global security environment, and it is
the more common and repeated interactions that in non-security IGOs with
a diverse set of states that help reduce military spending, not security-I GOs
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where member states are more likely to have strong pre-existing bilateral
relationships. Information from IGOs change the internal calculations of
states, who can substitute IGO membership for military strength, with the
influence ofIGOs extending beyond dyadic relationships. Yet the findings
also undermine the position that IGOs are inherently a pacific force in
the international system, as security IGOs have no discernable influence
on military spending rates. The expectation of the theory presented here
is that as states increase their participation in IGOs, they will reduce their
military spending rates, not eliminate or dramatically reduce them. States
continue to retain their ability to defend themselves as they increase their
IGO memberships. These are slight changes, amounting to no more than
2 percent of defense spending for the
most integrated states, and a tenth of a
percent for the least. The findings sug- This research suggests
gest that IGOs matter, but not nearly as that membership in
much as economic power, regime type, IGOs, specifically nonsecurity IGOs, reduces
or conflict.
While this research establishes the military spending rates.
link between certain types of I GOs and As states increase
reductions in military spending, there the number of IGO
are clear directions future research can memberships, they
take. First, the results here do not isolate reduce, albeit in small
specific IGOs, aside from those that do numbers, the size of their
not have a security mandate, and thus
military budgets.
we cannot tell for sure the exact nature
or specific functions various IGOs carry
out. This suggests that more research is needed to evaluate what particular information transmission processes work to reduce military spending
rates. Further, the results do not identify what kind of military spending
changes occur. Militaries may be making changes in strategy, such as fewer
troops and more intelligence spending. Future work should investigate
these shortcomings.
This research has direct policy implications. States should consider
how their commitments to security IGOs shape their defense planning,
and examine if those commitments are undermining their overall security
agenda. Policy makers can also consider actions that either increase the
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number of effective IGOs or strengthen the ties with preexisting memberships. Such action arguably will free up resources for investment in education, health care, emerging industries or possible tax cuts, all factors that
determine the health of a society in a global economy. States can continue
to utilize IGOs to coordinate collective state action, communication, and
facilitate conflict resolution mechanisms in the context of a dispute. It is
clear that some of these institutions are working to reduce the threat of
militarized conflict and facilitate state cooperation on shared interests.

International Civil Defense Organization (ICDO)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labor Organization
International Monetary Fund
Latin Union
Nordic Council of Ministers

Appendix A: List of Security IGOs

Nordic Development Fund (NDF)

ljfi

Nordic Economic Research Council
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

African Union

Organization of American States

Arab League

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

Arab Maghreb Union
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Commonwealth oflndependent States Charter

Organization of the Islamic Conference
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Southern African Development Community

Commonwealth Secretariat
Economic Community of Central African States
Economic Community of West African States
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

United Nations
Western European Union
World Trade Organization

European Economic Community/European Community
International Atomic Energy Agency
Inter-American Conference on Social Security
Inter-American Investment Corporation
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration/International Organization for
Migration
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Bank for Economic Cooperation
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
International Bureau for the Protection of the Moselle against Pollution
International Bureau for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property

62

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2016

Notes
1. Hartley, Kieth Todd and Sandler (1999). "NATO Burden Sharing: Past
and Future." Journal ofPeace Research. 36 ( 3): 665-680. And Smith. R. P. ( 1989).
"Models of Military Expenditure," Journal ofApplied Econometrics. 4 (4 ): 345-359.
2. Palmer, Glenn and Bhandari, Archana (2000). "Foreign Policy
Substitutability: Approaches and Findings." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 44
(1): 3-10. Morgan, Clifton, T. and Palmer, Glenn (2000). "A Model of Foreign
Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s)." Journal ofConflict
Resolution. 44( 1 ): 11-32.
3. Bohmelt, Tobias and Bove, Vincenzo (2014). "Forecasting Military
Expenditure." Research and Politics. (1)1:1-8. And ~ordhaus, William, Oneal,

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016

63

I
IGO MEMBERSHIP A..~D MILITARY SPENDING

PEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP

number of effective IGOs or strengthen the ties with preexisting memberships. Such action arguably will free up resources for investment in education, health care, emerging industries or possible tax cuts, all factors that
determine the health of a society in a global economy. States can continue
to utilize IGOs to coordinate collective state action, communication, and
facilitate conflict resolution mechanisms in the context of a dispute. It is
clear that some of these institutions are working to reduce the threat of
militarized conflict and facilitate state cooperation on shared interests.

International Civil Defense Organization (ICDO)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labor Organization
International Monetary Fund
Latin Union
Nordic Council of Ministers

Appendix A: List of Security IGOs

Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
Nordic Economic Research Council
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

African Union

Organization of American States

Arab League

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

Arab Maghreb Union
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Commonwealth oflndependent States Charter

Organization of the Islamic Conference
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Southern African Development Community

Commonwealth Secretariat
Economic Community of Central African States
Economic Community of West African States
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

United Nations
Western European Union
World Trade Organization

European Economic Community/European Community
International Atomic Energy Agency
Inter-American Conference on Social Security
Inter-American Investment Corporation
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration/International Organization for
Migration
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Bank for Economic Cooperation
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
International Bureau for the Protection of the Moselle against Pollution
International Bureau for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property

62

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016

Notes
1. Hartley, Kieth Todd and Sandler (1999). "NATO Burden Sharing: Past
and Future." Journal ofPeace Research. 36 (3): 665-680. And Smith. R. P. (1989).
"Models of Military Expenditure," Journal ofApplied Econometrics. 4 (4 ): 345-359.
2. Palmer, Glenn and Bhandari, Archana (2000). "Foreign Policy
Substitutability: Approaches and Findings." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 44
(1): 3-10. Morgan, Clifton, T. and Palmer, Glenn (2000). "A Model of Foreign
Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job( s). "Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 44(1): 11-32.
3. Bohmelt, Tobias and Bove, Vincenzo (2014). "Forecasting Military
Expenditure." Research and Politics. (1)1:1-8. And ~ordhaus, William, Oneal,

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2016

63

r
PEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP

John R. and Russett, Bruce (2012). "The Effects of the International Security
Environment on National Military Expenditures: A Multicountry Study."
International Organization. 66(3):491-513., are two of the more recent studies
examining the determinants of defense budgets.
4. Russett, Bruce & John Oneal (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton. And
Shannon, Megan, Daniel Morey, and Frederick Boehmke (2011). "The Influence
of International Organizations on Militarize Dispute Initiation and Duration."
International Studies Quarterly. 54( 4 ): 1123-1141. And Boehmer, Charles, Erik
Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom (2004). "Do Intergovernmental Organizations
Promote Peace?" World Politics. 57(1): 1-38.
5. Pevehouse, Jon (2002). "Democracy from the Outside-IN?: International
Organizations and Democracy." International Organization 56( 3): 515549, Pevehouse, Jon and Russett, Bruce (2006). "Democratic International
Governmental Organizations Promote Peace." International Organization 60( 4):
969-1000. Shannon, Megan (2009). "Preventing War and Providing the Peace?
International Organizations and the Management ofTerritorial Disputes." Conflict
Management and Peace Science. 26(2): 144-163. Shannon et al. (2011).
6. Russett and Oneal (2001).
7. Ibid.
8. Keohane, Robert (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
the World International Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9. The role of winning coalitions demanding payment through military
budgets has largely been contained to hegemons and authoritarian regimes, and
thus can be controlled for in the modeling process.
10. Bohmelt and Bove (2014). And Nordhaus et al. (2012).
11. Keohane and Martin (1995); Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
12. Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
13. Keohane and Martin (1995); Boehmer et al. (2004); and Pevehouse and
Russett ( 2006).
14. Oneal and Russett (2001); Boehmer et al. (2001); and Keohane and
Martin ( 1995 ), all provide support for this line ofreasoning.
15. Abbott Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (1998). "Why States Act Through
Formal Organizations." The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 42(1): 3-32.
16. Donno, Daniela, Metzger, Shawna, and Russett, Bruce (2015). "Screening
Out Risk: IGOs, Member State Selection, and Interstate Conflict, 1951-2000."
International Studies Quarterly. Vol 59 No 2: 251-263.
17. Fausett, Elizabeth and Volgy, Thomas J .. "Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs) and Interstate Conflict: Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative Dimensions

64

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2016

1

IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING

of Conflict in Postcommunist Space." International Studies Quarterly. 54.(1):
79-101.
18. Finnemore, Martha (1996). 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights
from Sociology's Institutionalism.' International Organization. 50 ( 3 ): 325-47;
Wendt, Alexander (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
19. Tannenwald, Nina (1999). "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." International Organization 53(3):
433-468.
20. Mearsheimer, John ( 1994). "The False Promise of International
Institutions." International Security 19( 3 ): 5-49.
21. Keohane and Martin ( 1994).
22 Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
23. See Arias, Aimee Kanner (2011). "Understanding the Complexities of
Security Governance in the An den Region. In The Security Governance ofRegional
Organizations. Edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Dominguez. Routledge:
New York.
24. Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
25. Goldblat, Jozef (2002). Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations
and Agreements. Sage: London.
26. Mundy, Simon. 2015. "North Korean Song of'Bumper Crop' Strikes a
Discordant Note." Financial Times. Accesssed 9.24.2015. http://www.ft.com/
ems/s/O /79 59ec78-58 38-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3mh8xl!RV.
27. Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003).
28. For example, consider the NATO partnership, where members have
shared exercises and strategic planning partnerships, but don't discuss all elements
of their capabilities. See Jervis, Robert (1998), "War and Misperception" in "The
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18
(2):675-700.
29. Consider the difficulty in obtaining reliable intelligence on opposing
state's military capabilities, which is compounded by misrepresentation of state
capabilities.
30. See Onis, Ziya and Suhnaz Yilmaz (2005 ). "The Turkey-EU- US Triangle
in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?," Middle East Journal Vol. 59 (2 ):
265-284 for a more complete discussion.
31. Consider the role of Hawks, who according to Kahneman and Renshon
(2007) speak to the psychology humans who have built in bias leaning toward
aggressive action in the face of an adversary. The idea, while not new is clear, policies

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016

65

~\

I
PEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP

John R. and Russett, Bruce (2012). "The Effects of the International Security
Environment on National Military Expenditures: A Multicountry Study."
International Ot;ganization. 66(3):491-513., are two of the more recent studies
examining the determinants of defense budgets.
4. Russett, Bruce & John Oneal (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton. And
Shannon, Megan, Daniel Morey, and Frederick Boehmke ( 2011). "The Influence
of International Organizations on Militarize Dispute Initiation and Duration."
International Studies Quarterly. 54( 4 ): 1123-1141. And Boehmer, Charles, Erik
Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom (2004). "Do Intergovernmental Organizations
Promote Peace?" World Politics. 57( 1 ): 1-38.
5. Pevehouse, Jon (2002). "Democracy from the Outside-IN?: International
Organizations and Democracy." International Organization 56( 3): 515549, Pevehouse, Jon and Russett, Bruce (2006). "Democratic International
Governmental Organizations Promote Peace." International Ot;ganization 60( 4):
969-1000. Shannon, Megan (2009). "Preventing War and Providing the Peace?
International Organizations and the Management ofTerritorial Disputes." Conflict
Management and Peace Science. 26(2): 144-163. Shannon et al. (2011 ).
6. Russett and Oneal (2001).
7. Ibid.
8. Keohane, Robert (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
the World International Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9. The role of winning coalitions demanding payment through military
budgets has largely been contained to hegemons and authoritarian regimes, and
thus can be controlled for in the modeling process.
10. Bohmelt and Bove (2014). And Nordhaus et al. (2012).
11. Keohane and Martin (1995); Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
12. Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
13. Keohane and Martin (1995); Boehmer et al. (2004); and Pevehouse and
Russett (2006).
14. Oneal and Russett (2001); Boehmer et al. (2001); and Keohane and
Martin ( 1995 ), all provide support for this line of reasoning.
15. Abbott Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (1998). "Why States Act Through
Formal Organizations." The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 42( 1 ): 3-32.
16. Donno, Daniela, Metzger, Shawna, and Russett, Bruce (2015). "Screening
Out Risk: IGOs, Member State Selection, and Interstate Conflict, 1951-2000."
International Studies Quarterly. Vol 59 No 2: 251-263.
17. Fausett, Elizabeth and Volgy, Thomas J .. "Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs) and Interstate Conflict: Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative Dimensions

64

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2016

I~

IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING

of Conflict in Postcommunist Space." International Studies Quarterly. 54.( 1 ):
79-101.
18. Finnemore, Martha (1996). 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights
from Sociology's Institutionalism.' International Ot;ganization. 50 (3): 325-47;
Wendt, Alexander (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
19. Tannenwald, Nina (1999). "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." International Organization 53(3):
433-468.
20. Mearsheimer, John ( 1994). "The False Promise of International
Institutions." International Security 19(3): 5-49.
21. Keohane and Martin ( 1994).
22 Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
23. See Arias, Aimee Kanner (2011). "Understanding the Complexities of
Security Governance in the Anden Region. In The Security Governance ofRegional
Organizations. Edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Dominguez. Routledge:
New York.
24. Pevehouse and Russett (2006).
25. Goldblat, Jozef (2002). Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations
and Agreements. Sage: London.
26. Mundy, Simon. 2015. "North Korean Song of 'Bumper Crop' Strikes a
Discordant Note." Financial Times. Accesssed 9.24.2015. http://www.ft.com/
ems/s/O /79 59ec78-58 38-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3mh8xllRV.
27. Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003).
28. For example, consider the NATO partnership, where members have
shared exercises and strategic planning partnerships, but don't discuss all elements
of their capabilities. See Jervis, Robert (1998), "War and Misperception" in "The
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18
(2):675-700.
29. Consider the difficulty in obtaining reliable intelligence on opposing
state's military capabilities, which is compounded by misrepresentation of state
capabilities.
30. See Onis, Ziya and Suhnaz Yilmaz (2005). "The Turkey-EU-US Triangle
in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?," Middle East JournalVol. 59 (2):
265-284 for a more complete discussion.
31. Consider the role of Hawks, who according to Kahneman and Renshon
( 2007) speak to the psychology humans who have built in bias leaning toward
aggressive action in the face of an adversary. The idea, while not new is clear, policies

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016

65

rPEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP

that offer strength and aggression over the promise of reciprocal cooperation have
greater appeal to most voters, citizens, and policy makers.
32 Fausett and Volgy (2010).
33. Ibid.
34 Oneal and Russett (2001).
35. While there are several sanctions currently implemented by the UNSC,
here I am referring to Resolution 1737 (2006).
36. Some scholars argue that sanctions are a form of conflict; the point being
made here is that no militarized violence occurred (See Oudraat 2000). Based on
this previous research, it is not surprising to find that some policy makers have
argued that Iran and the U.S. are fighting a proxy war in Iraq (NYT 4/12/2008
"Iran Fighting Proxy War in Iraq, Envoy Says."), and it is safe to assume that
U.S. Intelligence agencies are working to infiltrate key Iranian institutions for the
purpose of sabotage and intelligence gathering. However, the nuclear issue is one
of many points of contention, and the ongoing interactions in Iraq and elsewhere
do not take away from the fact that the two states have not gone to war directly
with one another.
37. Goldsmith, Benjamin. (2003). "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989:
Why Spend More?" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47(5): 551-73.; Bueno de
Mesquita et al. ( 2003).
38. Although many authoritarian leaders must distribute private goods to
maintain power, evidence suggests that public goods are also part of the calculus
in retaining power. See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
39. Certainly some authoritarian state leaders retain their positions by appeasing military leaders or coup-proofing, which drives up military spending rates.
However, there is an upper bound to this resource distribution, and thus such
authoritarian leaders can be shaped by IGOs in similar ways as democracies.
40. Goldsmith (2003, 2007) and Smith ( 1989) are representational of the
approach the fields of economics and political science have theorized on the
demand for military spending. Goldsmith, Benjamin (2003) "Bearing the Defense
Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?,'' Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(5):
551-73; and Goldsmith, Benjamin (2007) "Defense Effort and Institutional
Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory: Why Try Harder?" Security Studies
16(2): 189-222.
41 See for further discussion Fordham, Benjamin and Walker, Thomas
(2005) "Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do
Democracies Spend Less?" International Studies Quarterly, 141-15 7; Goldsmith
(2003, 2007).
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Paul and Mohammed, Nadir A.L. (1995), 'Military Spending in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Some Evidence for 1967-85." Journal ofPeace Research. (32)3: 331-343;
Goldsmith (2003, 2007); Fordham and Walker (2005 ). The evidence from these
contributions clearly demonstrates that democracies have lower rates of military
spending than non-democracies. Moreover, democratic countries will be more
susceptible to the substitution that IGOs offer states, given the closer connection
between leader retainment and appeasement of the winning coalition with public
goods spending. Data for regime type comes from the Polity Project. Marshall,
Monty (2004). Polity IV Dataset. Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm.

69. I dropped from the analysis the 10 percent of observations (country-years)
with the highest Total IGO Membership score.
70. These include France, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy, which are the eight most integrated
states. An additional model not reported here that included the regional indicators
but not the eight most integrated states produced similar results as model 3.
71. The Stata command xtunitroot was used which combines a number of
unit roots or stationarity in panel datasets.

57 There are a number of contributions that examine this influence, including Benoit, Emile (1973). Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,
Lexington Books: New York; Rasler, Karen A., and William R. Thompson (1992).
"Political-Economic Tradeoffs and British Relative Decline,'' In Defense, Welfare,
and Growth, ed. Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, London: Routledge Kegan Paul:
36-60; and Smith (1989).
58. This is a simple count of the number of sea or land based borders a given
country has and is drawn from the COW data.
59. Bohmelt and Bove (2014), 3.
60. Nordhaus et. al. (2012).
61. Smith (1995).
62. The following countries are not included in the modeling. Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia,
Slovenia.
63. Missing data is not a major concern for this study. There are a number of
observations of missing data for military spending, but they do not pose problems
in terms of biasing the results given how few observations are missing.
64. Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (2003). "CLARIFY:
Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." Journal of Statistical
Software, 8. Copy at http://j.mp/k3k0rx.
65. This calculation is based on the average non-security IGO value, not Spain's
actual Non-security IGO percentage value, which is not available for 2012.
66. This figure was calculated by taking the projected savings of the budget
and adding it to the final military budget for 1996, and then calculating what
percentage it made up.
67. All figures drawn from the analysis are in 1996 US Dollars.
68. The regions are North America, South America, Europe, Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania as the reference category in model 6.
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